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Abstract. Recently, there have been several successful deep learning
approaches for automatically classifying chest X-ray images into differ-
ent disease categories. However, there is not yet a comprehensive vul-
nerability analysis of these models against the so-called adversarial per-
turbations/attacks, which makes deep models more trustful in clinical
practices. In this paper, we extensively analyzed the performance of two
state-of-the-art classification deep networks on chest X-ray images. These
two networks were attacked by three different categories (ten methods
in total) of adversarial methods (both white- and black-box), namely
gradient-based, score-based, and decision-based attacks. Furthermore,
we modified the pooling operations in the two classification networks
to measure their sensitivities against different attacks, on the specific
task of chest X-ray classification.
Keywords: Adversarial perturbation · chest X-ray classification · deep
learning
1 Introduction
The chest X-ray is among the top most commonly accessible medical imaging
examinations used for affordable screening and diagnosis of numerous lung ail-
ments including pneumothorax, mass, cardiomegaly, effusion, and pneumonia.
Owing to huge numbers of patients and increasing burden of lung ailments, the
workload of radiologists has significantly multiplied. Hence, with an intention to
accelerate/support the predictions of radiologists, many machine (deep) learning
classification frameworks have emerged over the past few years.
The availability of a new large scale chest X-ray dataset namely ”ChestX-
ray14” [20], which comprises 30,805 patients and 112,120 chest X-ray images,
makes it feasible to apply deep learning without a need for data augmenta-
tion or synthetic data. Recently, different standard classification deep networks
(AlexNet [7], VGGNet [14] and ResNet [5]) have been applied to this dataset.
Wang et al. [20] applied pre-trained AlexNet, GoogLeNet [17], VGG, and ResNet-
50 architectures to classify 8 disease categories. They showed that ResNet-50
achieves superior performance compared to the other applied models. Guendel
et al. [4] proposed a local aware dense network for classification of 14 pathology
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classes in the ChestX-ray14 dataset. Rajpurkar et al. [12] proposed CheXNet, a
121-layer convolutional neural network trained on ChestX-ray14 for the pneu-
monia disease detection task, which exceeds average radiologist performance on
the F1 metric. Baltruschat et al. [1] proposed a fine-tuned ResNet-50 network
which achieved high accuracy on 4 out of the 14 disease classes in the chest
X-ray dataset. Yao et al. [21] presented a partial solution to constraints in us-
ing LSTMs to leverage inter-dependencies among target labels in predicting 14
pathological classes from chest X-rays.
The generalizability of the deep learning methods, i.e. how they perform
on unseen chest X-ray test images, have been explored in the above mentioned
works to some extent. However, discovery of ”adversarial examples” has exposed
serious vulnerabilities in even state-of-the-art deep learning systems [8]. As of
writing there is no comprehensive study on the vulnerability analysis of the state-
of-the art classification networks against adversarial perturbations for chest X-
rays. Samuel G. et al. [3] considered a single attack, namely projected gradient
descent [9,6] on chest X-ray images.
Adversarial images are crafted by adding perturbations, imperceptible to the
naked eye, to the clean images to fool machine learning models. Different cate-
gories [22] of adversarial attacks on images have been recently developed which
have been highly successful in fooling deep neural networks. In the medical image
analysis domain, attacks may originate during data-transfer through the Internet
or local networks [3]. Even in the case of complete protection from adversarial
attacks, training existing deep models with adversarial examples or designing
defense mechanisms [23] can improve model generalizability and resilience. In
this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of ten different adversarial at-
tacks on classification of chest X-ray images and investigate how two different
standard deep neural networks perform against adversarial perturbations. We
perform both white (i.e. producing perturbed images using network A and clas-
sifying them by the same network) and black-box (i.e. producing perturbed
images using network A and classifying them by network B) attacks.
2 Methods
2.1 Applied deep networks
We use two state-of-the-art deep models i.e. Inception-ResNet-v2 [16] and Nasnet-
Large [24] to evaluate their performance on classification of both clean and per-
turbed chest X-ray images. Next, we modify the networks by replacing max-
pooling operations with average-pooling to analyze whether the modified net-
works, especially the ones that are based on single/few pixel perturbation, are
less sensitive to attacks. We hypothesize that average-pooling may be more re-
silient to attacks as it captures more global contextual information from the field
of view, instead of selecting a single pixel candidate as max-pooling does.
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2.2 Applied adversarial attacks
We applied three different categories of attacks namely gradient-based, score-
based, and decision-based:
– Gradient-based attacks linearize the loss (in our case binary cross-entropy)
around an input to which the model predictions for a particular class are most
sensitive to. These attacks perturb the image with the gradient of the loss
w.r.t. the clean image, gradually and efficiently increasing the magnitude
until the model predicts a different label for the perturbed image. In our ex-
periments, we have selected five different gradient-based attacks namely, Fast
Gradient Sign Method (G1) [8], Projected Gradient Descent (G2) [9], Deep-
Fool (G3) [10], Linfinity Basic Iterative Method (G4) [8],Limited-memory
Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno Method (L-BFGS) (G5) [18] and we
demonstrate how the models trained on clean images perform against the
crafted adversarial examples.
– Score-based attacks rely on confidence scores e.g. softmax class probabil-
ities or logits to numerically estimate the gradient. From this group, we
apply Local Search (S1) [11] (a black box attack based on the greedy local
search algorithm to find pixels for which the model is the most sensitive
and perturbing them to misclassify the input) and the Single Pixel (S2) [15]
attacks.
– Decision-based attacks [2] solely rely on the predicted class or label of the
model without requiring gradients or logits. From this group, we applied
Gaussian Blur (D1), Contrast Reduction (D2) and Additive Gaussian Noise
(D3) in our experiments. In all of the aforementioned attacks, a line-search
is performed internally to find minimal perturbations required by the image
to turn it into an adversarial example.
We trained both the networks from scratch with a batch size of 32 and 8
for training the Inception-ResNet-v2 and Nasnet-Large, respectively. RMSProp
optimizer [19] with a decay of 0.9 and  = 1 and an initial learning rate of 0.045,
decayed every 4 epochs using an exponential rate of 0.94 were used for all of our
experiments as described in [16,24]. We set all attack parameters as proposed
by their authors and utilized Foolbox [13], to craft adversarial examples.
3 Dataset
We use ChestX-ray14 dataset [20] which comprises 112,120 gray-scale images
with 14 disease labels and 1 no-finding label. We treat all the disease classes as
positive and formulate a binary classification task of ”disease” vs. ”non-disease”.
We randomly selected 95,128 images for training and 16,792 for validation. We
randomly picked 200 unseen images as the test set, with 93 images with chest
disease labels and 107 having ”no finding” labels. These clean images are used
for carrying out different adversarial attacks and the models trained on clean
images are evaluated against them.
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4 Results and discussion
Figure 1 shows the perturbed images produced by the ten different applied at-
tacks. In Figure 2, we visualize a few samples where the perturbations are per-
ceptible by human. We observed that most of the produced images by D1 (i.e
Gaussian blur), D2 (i.e. contrast reduction), D3 (i.e additive Gaussian noise),
S1 (i.e. local search) attack can be easily detected by the naked eye. We also
found that S1 requires relatively more time compared to other methods to find
an adversarial image.
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Fig. 1. Perturbed images produced by 10 (3 categories) different attacks.
In Tables 1 and 2, we report accuracy and area under ROC for two networks
with/without modification for clean and ten different adversarial attacks (white-
and black-box). Note that the single pixel attack [15] i.e. S2 (from the score based
attacks category) failed to fool the networks for the entire test set which shows
the single pixel attack works well on RGB (colored images) but not on gray-scale
X-ray images as it is not simple to fool a deep model by changing only a single
”gray-scale” pixel.
As reported in Table 1, the gradient based attacks were almost completely
successful in fooling both networks (with/without modification) when the vic-
tim model for attack was the same reference model, i.e. in a white-box attack
scenario. The decision and score based attacks were almost unsuccessful in fool-
ing the models. We observed that Nasnet-Large with average pooling was 18%
stronger in comparison to Nasnet-Large with max pooling. Note that the local
search attack (S1) completely failed against Nasnet-Large with average-pooling.
In Table 2, we show the performance of both the networks against the black-
box attacks i.e. we craft adversarial images with Inception-ResNet-v2, but test
them with Nasnet-Large and vice versa. As reported in the table, almost all
the methods were partially successful but not as high as white-box attacks. For
gradient based black-box attacks, average pooling shows more resiliency against
the attacks. We observed that for 23%±9% and 27%±8% of the test samples both
the networks failed on the same cases for average and max pooling, respectively.
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Table 1. Performance of original/modified Inception-ResNet-v2 (IR2) and Nasnet-
Large (NL) against ten different white-box attacks. In the Table, MP, AP, Acc., AU
refer to max-pooling, average-pooling, accuracy, and area under ROC, respectively.
Model Metrics Clean
Gradient Decision Score
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 D1 D2 D3 S1 S2
MP
IR2
Acc. 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.32 0.65 0.70
AU 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.52 0.74 0.75
NL
Acc. 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.41 0.30 0.32 0.73
AU 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.66 0.58 0.55 0.77
AP
IR2
Acc. 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.14 0.62 0.71
AU 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.39 0.26 0.72 0.74
NL
Acc. 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.41 0.48 0.72 0.72
AU 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.64 0.64 0.74 0.74
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Fig. 2. Human perceptible adversarial perturbations
Table 2. Performance of original/modified Inception-ResNet-v2 (IR2) and Nasnet-
Large (NL) against ten different black-box attacks. In the Table, MP, AP, Acc., AU
refer to max-pooling, average-pooling, accuracy, and area under ROC, respectively.
Model Metrics Clean
Gradient Decision Score
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 D1 D2 D3 S1 S2
MP
IR2
Acc. 0.70 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.53 0.81 0.36 0.45 0.70
AU 0.75 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.84 0.24 0.40 0.75
NL
Acc. 0.73 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.74 0.56 0.73
AU 0.77 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.82 0.55 0.77
AP
IR2
Acc. 0.71 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.29 0.40 0.53 0.71
AU 0.74 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.24 0.40 0.52 0.74
NL
Acc. 0.72 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.38 0.72
AU 0.74 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.74
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Fig. 3. Probability values of the original and modified networks after attack
In Figure 3, we show the probability values of the two networks (with/without
modification) only after successful attacks on the disease class. Higher ranges/values
indicate a stronger attack or a more vulnerable network. As shown in the figure,
D3 (i.e. Additive Gaussian Noise), S1 (i.e. Local search) and G5 (i.e. L-BFGS)
attacks are highly sensitive to the choice of pooling (max/average) operation.
The range of the attack’s confidence varies from ∼ 0.50 to ∼ 0.55. Note that
absence of a box in the figure means there was no successful attack for a disease
class in that experiment. In Figure 4, we visualize the accuracy of Inception-
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Fig. 4. Distribution of adversarial images crafted based on Inception-ResNet-v2 net-
work w.r.t. human perception. The dots and stars in the figure refer to max and average
pooling, respectively. The words Obvious, Mixed, and Hard refer to the level of diffi-
culty for a human to perceive the attacks.
ResNet-v2 for different groups of attacks and, in the same plot, we show the
perceptibility of each group of the attacks (i.e. the difficulty level for a human
to detect a perturbed image). Note that lower accuracy and harder detection
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(lower right of the plot) implies a more successful attack. As shown in the fig-
ure, gradient based attacks are the most successful ones in terms of fooling both
human (i.e. perception) and machine (i.e. accuracy).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we extensively tested the vulnerability of the two state-of-the-art
deep classification networks against ten different adversarial attacks on chest
X-ray images. We found that the single pixel attack completely failed for gray-
level X-ray chest images. We also showed that the pooling operation can make
a considerable difference for some attacks, even leading to a complete failure of
the attack for a particular class. We also demonstrated that the crafted adver-
sarial images with some of the attacks, e.g. Gaussian blur and contrast reduction
methods, can be simply detected with the naked eye. Finally, we showed that
the gradient based attacks applied to the chest X-ray images are the most suc-
cessful in terms of fulling both machine and human. Although both networks,
Inception-ResNet-v2 and Nasnet-Large, failed against gradient-based attacks, in
general, the latter (with average pooling) was more resilient to decision and score
based attacks.
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